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Abstract 
We describe the research undertaken in the six month JISC/EPSRC funded My Private Cloud 
project, in which we built a demonstration cloud file storage service that allows users to login 
to it, by using their existing credentials from a configured trusted identity provider. Once 
authenticated, users are shown a set of accounts that they are the owners of, based on their 
identity attributes. Once users open one of their accounts, they can upload and download files 
to it. Not only that, but they can then grant access to their file resources to anyone else in the 
federated system, regardless of whether their chosen delegate has used the cloud service 
before or not. The system uses standard identity management protocols, attribute based 
access controls, and a delegation service. A set of APIs have been defined for the 
authentication, authorisation and delegation processes, and the software has been released as 
open source to the community. A public demonstration of the system is available online. 
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Introduction 
When anyone offers a new cloud service, one of the first things they typically do is register 
the new users and give them a new set of credentials. We believe this is sub-optimal practise 
for a number of reasons. Firstly it is burdensome on the user, who already has too many sets 
of credentials to remember. Secondly it is burdensome on the cloud software developer, who 
has to: determine what type of authentication scheme to use, build a secure store for the new 
credentials and ensure that the authentication mechanism works securely and correctly. 
Thirdly it is burdensome on the operational staff who may have to register and remove users 
from the system and deal with users losing their credentials and asking for new ones. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, it can lead to security vulnerabilities, since it now becomes a 
target for hackers to attack and steal the users’ credentials [1], and users tend to lighten their 
mental load by either choosing weak and easy to remember passwords or using the same 
password for each of their systems. 
All of these burdens can be reduced if we make use of trust within systems. Trust is known to 
lower the cost of doing business [2]. If you can get a trusted third party to provide a service 
you need, which they specialise in, at less cost to yourself, then you don’t have to provide it, 
and you can both benefit from the transaction. You obtain a higher quality of service at a 
lower cost, and they profit from selling their expertise. Since cloud service providers want 
users to trust them and use their new services, isn’t it reasonable to expect those same cloud 
service providers to trust other service providers who already specialise in authenticating and 
identifying users? These latter service providers are known as identity providers (IdPs), and 
there are already thousands of them in existence today, providing their services to existing 
end user service providers, through a process known as identity federation. 
This trust based approach was adopted by the My Private Cloud project, a six month project 
funded by EPSRC/JISC, to see how trust based services from the EC funded Trusted 
Architecture for Securely Shared Services (TAS3) project [3] could be applied to cloud 
services. From our experiences of building federated services in the EC TAS3 project, we 
decided to apply this to the open source S3 cloud service offered by Eucalyptus [4]. TAS3’s 
trust model is based on Ronald Reagan’s famous saying “trust but verify”. When applied to 
web service providers this means that web services’ clients (WSCs) are able to trust web 
service providers (WSPs) to provide the security services they advertise, by virtue of both the 
contractual agreements they offer and the reputations they have earned from other service 
users. Moreover the clients can subsequently validate that the WSPs do provide these services 
according to their contractual legal agreements through an audit summary which is sent 
directly to them. In the context of the current project, the S3 cloud service is the WSC. Once 
we have acknowledged that WSPs can be trusted, we can start to build the trust, security and 
privacy preserving infrastructures that cloud service providers require, by relying on these 
trusted third parties to operate parts of the security infrastructure. As researchers we can turn 
our attention to the problems of designing and building tools and services for a large scale 
trusted federated privacy preserving cloud infrastructure, with fine grained access control, 
user accessible audit trails, and trust assurance mechanisms. 
Current state of the Art 
When users submit their personal data to web sites and cloud providers today, they have to 
trust that the provider will act in accordance with its advertised policies and contract terms. 
Users typically have no visibility about what happens to their data after it has been given to 
the provider. Users have little evidence to tell them which providers to trust and have no 
control over the policy that is applied by the service provider to their data. If users do not 
agree to the provider’s terms and conditions, they are typically not allowed to use the service. 
In the case of Amazon S3, for example, the user is presented with a lengthy legal document 
that has the following clause buried within it [5]: 
4.2 Other Security and Backup. You are responsible for properly configuring 
and using the Service Offerings and taking your own steps to maintain 
appropriate security, protection and backup of Your Content, which may 
include the use of encryption technology to protect Your Content from 
unauthorized access and routine archiving Your Content. 
This places a considerable burden on the user (data encryption, backup etc.) and seems to 
absolve the cloud service provider from all responsibility to keep the data secure, and from 
any liability should the data be lost, compromised or corrupted. This type of clause represents 
a significant inhibitor to many users which prevents them from using cloud computing today. 
Many researchers similarly assume that cloud service providers cannot be trusted and that all 
data must be encrypted before it is submitted to the cloud, see for example [6]. Mowbray and 
Pearson [7] recognize the problem of privacy protection when submitting sensitive 
information to (untrusted) clouds. Their solution uses a client based privacy manager which 
obfuscates sensitive data before submitting it to the cloud. 
However, organisations have been regularly outsourcing (unencrypted) data and processing 
to third party providers for decades [8]. Many UK government’s IT services are already run 
by third party providers and this is expected to grow and migrate to cloud computing [9]. 
Consequently many organisations are routinely used to trusting third parties with their data 
and the processing of it. It therefore seems logical to assume that most cloud service 
providers will similarly assume the ‘trusted data handler’ label in due course. My Private 
Cloud aimed to facilitate this process by providing cloud service providers (cloud SPs) with 
the software tools, procedures and services to easily offer trusted cloud services to cloud 
users, by relying in part on external trusted WSPs. 
Current cloud platforms (e.g. Amazon, Google, Eucalyptus etc.) do not support federated 
access, delegation of authority, or fine grained access control. They primarily use a simple 
Access Control List (ACL) to provide access to other cloud users. In general, these are coarse 
grained. Controlling who might invoke a virtual machine is often restricted to everyone or 
no-one. Amazon’s S3’s ACLs only allows users to specify the following access levels: 
anonymous access (everyone, including non-Amazon Web Services (AWS) users), all AWS 
users, or named individual AWS users. All existing ACL based systems are limited in only 
being able to grant controlled access to other registered users. Amazon has recently extended 
its Access Control system with Bucket Policies. These policies allow users to manage access 
to their S3 resources at the bucket level for both the buckets and the objects, providing a more 
fine grained access control for those resources, but still limited to other registered Amazon 
users. As pointed out in [10], this rather crude access control mechanism makes it difficult to 
use S3 as part of a (large) science project involving many collaborators. Also, the lack of a 
fine-grained delegation mechanism impedes the use of S3 in data-driven science projects 
where scientists often want to delegate access rights to a particular data set to an 
application/job running on their behalf. 
Different approaches to the cloud access control problem have been published in the 
literature. V. Echevarrıa et.al [11] have developed a novel approach called Permission as a 
Service (PaaS) which provides a separate access control service from the other cloud 
services. In PaaS, user data is encrypted in the cloud, using attribute based encryption (ABE), 
to maintain confidentiality. Permissions are managed via decryption keys based on the 
attributes of the users being granted access. Our approach is similar to PaaS, in that access is 
granted based on the attributes of the user, but there the similarity ends. We assume the cloud 
service provider can be trusted to keep the information confidential, so encryption is not 
mandatory (though the cloud provider can encrypt the data, as an optional value added 
service, if it wishes to). The user is given confidence to do this through the ability to attach 
“sticky” policies to his data and receive audit summaries from the cloud SP. The permissions 
in our system are provided by ACLs decided by the user following the discretionary access 
control model. Moreover, our system permits delegation of access and allows the user to give 
permission to someone who is not an existing cloud user, as long as they can be authenticated 
by one of the trusted federation IdPs. 
Recent work by Dongwan Shin [12] added fine grained role based access controls to IaaS, by 
introducing a trusted domain that is used to manage users, roles and access permissions. But 
all the users, roles and permissions are managed centrally within this domain, thus it does not 
provide federated access or allow roles and attributes to be assigned by external attribute 
authorities, as in for example the UK Access Management Federation [13]. We believe that 
these are essential features for scalability, and they are provided as part of the current project. 
Federated identity management, for example, as typified in the Shibboleth implementation 
[14], comprises a trusted Identity Provider (IdP), Service Provider (SP) and user agent 
(usually a web browser). The user attempts to access the SP via his user agent, but the SP, not 
knowing who the user is, redirects the user to its trusted IdP for authentication. If the SP 
supports multiple IdPs, then it may first ask the user to choose which IdP he wants to use for 
authentication. When the user’s agent contacts the IdP, the user is asked to authenticate, and 
if successful, the IdP redirects the user back to the SP, providing the agent with digitally 
signed assertions to present to the SP. These assertions say that the user has been 
authenticated by the IdP, and that he has the attached identity attributes. These attributes may 
include a unique persistent identifier (PID) for the user, so that the SP can provide a personal 
service for the user on repeated visits. When we apply this model to cloud services, the cloud 
service provider (cloud SP) becomes the SP, and the IdP can be any existing IdP which the 
cloud SP trusts, from any existing federation to which the cloud SP belongs. 
Delegation of Authority allows a user (the delegator) to delegate any of his privileges to 
another user or application of his choice (the delegate) [15]. When role based or attribute 
based access controls are used, then the delegator may delegate a role or attribute instead of a 
privilege, since privileges are assigned to roles and attributes. This form of delegation is 
superior to existing grid based delegation that relies on proxy certificates [16], since i) the 
delegate must authenticate as himself, and not as a child of the delegator as in proxy 
certificates (which is a form of masquerade) and ii) fine grained delegation is automatically 
supported by the delegator delegating a subset of his identity attributes. Delegation in 
federated systems is made more difficult because the cloud SP may not have had contact with 
the delegate before, therefore does not know how to recognise which user is the chosen 
delegate. 
Original project objectives 
The main objective of the My Private Cloud project was to port existing research software, 
tools and methods from the European FP7 integrated project TAS3, to the cloud, in order to 
undertake the following proof-of-concept activities: 
i. integrate a trust and reputation infrastructure into cloud services that will allow users to 
determine which cloud providers are the most trustworthy, and that will block 
untrustworthy users from gaining access to cloud resources; 
ii. allow the users to set their own fine grained privacy policies for controlling all accesses 
to their data whilst it is in the cloud; 
iii. automatically enforce the user’s privacy policy before any requestor is allowed access to 
the user’s data; 
iv. ensure that the user’s privacy policy is “stuck” to their data and follows their data 
around as it moves through the cloud; 
v. allow the users to dynamically update their policies; 
vi. ensure that legal and other policies (such as the cloud provider’s) are also enforced as 
well as the user’s privacy policy, and that appropriate conflict resolution strategies are 
adopted when conflicts arise; 
vii. provide users with the ability to delegate access to their data to any other entities of their 
choosing; 
viii. provide federated access to cloud services and the user’s data, thereby not constraining 
the set of users (to those only known to the cloud provider); 
ix. include the level of assurance (LoA), a measure of trustworthiness, in the authentication 
assertion so that access decisions can be based on this; 
x. allow requestors to aggregate their roles and attributes from multiple sources of 
authority so that finer grained privacy policies can be created; 
xi. provide users with (configurable) audit trails that provide them with full visibility of 
what happens to their data whilst it is in the cloud; 
xii. provide an optional access over-ride capability (so called break the glass policies) which 
allow responsible requestors to over-ride the access control decision in an emergency 
situation, when they are willing to justify this later. 
The above were to be achieved by utilizing the software deliverables from the European FP7 
TAS3 integrated project (http://www.tas3.eu/), which has provided open source software for 
the construction of a Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services. 
Objectives shown in bold above were fully achieved, as well as some new originally 
unanticipated objectives described in section 4 below. Those shown in italics above were 
partially achieved, whilst those shown in normal font were not attempted due to the time 
constraints of the project. 
New objectives 
Whilst the original objectives remained valid, they could not all be achieved in the short 
duration of the project (6 months) due to the addition of new higher priority objectives which 
became apparent once the project had started. When developing the first prototype it soon 
became obvious that (sticky) policy based authorisation systems on their own cannot provide 
the user friendly access control functionality that is required. Specifically, a policy decision 
point (PDP), which evaluates the policies stuck to a resource, typically only answers Grant or 
Deny1 to a request to access the resource. But when a delegated user logs into the cloud, he 
does not necessarily know which resources have been delegated to him by other users (and 
even if he did, one would not want to burden the user with the mental effort of having to 
remember all the resources’ URLs). The only way the system could find out which resources 
were available to the delegate, using a PDP alone, would be to cycle through its entire list of 
resources asking the PDP if this user has access to them. This clearly is not feasible for cloud-
scale resources, so another solution had to be sought. This introduced two new higher priority 
objectives into the project, namely: 
- given the attributes of a user, enable the authorisation system to be able to instantly say 
which resources the user potentially has access to, and 
- given a resource, enable the authorisation system to be able to instantly say which users, 
based on their attributes, potentially have access to this resource. 
When these two objectives are implemented as services, we can use them to locate a user’s 
resources at login time, and after that use the PDP to perform fine grained access control on 
them. 
Once we started the project implementation, we realised that in order to gain wide scale 
implementer acceptance, simply specifying the standard protocols and services that need to 
be implemented would not be sufficient. The EC TAS3 project had done this, but 
considerable implementation effort is still needed in order to utilise the security and trust web 
services that it provides. Many toolkits need to be used in order to create the secure SOAP 
messages that are needed to talk the various protocols that the different security web services 
use. A much simpler interface is needed, which led to another higher priority objective: 
- can we specify a set of easy to use APIs that will make it very easy for implementers to 
integrate the security services that we are providing into their cloud applications? 
Consequently significant effort was spent during the project in specifying and implementing 
these APIs (in both natural language and in our chosen implementation language, PHP). 
Finally, we wanted to make the federated S3 service very easy to use by end users. Amazon’s 
S3 service is web browser based, whereas Eucalytus’s S3 uses a command line client. We 
preferred the browser interface as it is much easier to use, so another objective was added: 
- can we to make the Eucalyptus S3 service accessible via a standard web browser so that no 
new software is needed by the end user? 
The result of this, is that our project then focussed on creating a front end web application 
(our new proxyS3 software) that interfaces with the user, with the security APIs and with the 
Eucalyptus S3 service (Walrus) at the backend. This web application is called the proxyS3 
server. Unfortunately a disproportionate amount of effort was spent during the project on this 
last objective, which we will discuss again in Lessons Learnt. 
Architecture and design 
The overall architecture is shown in Figure 1. The cloud service makes use of many external 
security services via a set of 3 security APIs: one for authentication, one for authorisation, 
and one for delegation. Behind each of the APIs lie infrastructure components that provide 
the appropriate service to the API. This architecture allows the infrastructure components to 
be changed, upgraded, and replaced etc. without affecting the functional service that the API 
provides to the application (although the quality of the service may vary with different 
backend components). 
Figure 1 The overall architecture. 
The Authn API acts as a federation SP which contacts the configured federation IdP asking it 
to authenticate the user and return his identity attributes, including a Persistent ID (PID). The 
Authn API talks the standard SAML protocol, enhanced with the level of assurance, so that it 
can talk to any IdP that supports this. In our architecture we replace the (single) federation 
IdP with a proxyIdP that: 
i. is capable of talking multiple IdP protocols such as SAML, OpenID, OAuth etc. to a 
variety of IdPs. This allows us to add new IdPs and new IdP protocols at any time, without 
effecting the cloud service, since its API continues to talk the enhanced SAML protocol to 
the proxy IdP; 
ii. is configured with the level of assurance (LoA) of each federated IdP, so that it can inform 
the cloud service how trustworthy the IdP is; 
iii. allows the user to choose which IdP he wishes to use for authentication, from the set that 
is available; 
iv. allows the user to link together his various IdP accounts in order to aggregate his attributes 
and increase the LoA; 
v. allows the cloud service provider to integrate its own corporate LDAP service in order to 
retrieve the identity attributes of its employees for finer grained access control; 
vi. has a configurable Credential Validation Service (CVS) which contains policy rules saying 
which IdPs are trusted to issue which attributes to whom [17]. 
The proxy IdP is an enhancement of the SimpleSAMLphp [18] IdP. We added two new 
modules to it, and replaced the Facebook module which was out of date. Figure 2 shows the 
IdP selection screen that is presented to the user. After the user chooses his IdP, he is 
redirected to it, authenticates, and is then returned to the cloud service, which is given the full 
set of identity attributes of the user, including the PID and the LoA, by the proxy IdP. The 
design, implementation and user trials of the proxyIdP are described in [19]. A full 
description of the Authn API can be found in [20] and in the online documentation of the 
proxy S3 service [21]. 
Figure 2 The proxyIDP screen. 
The Authz API is responsible for authorising the user to access resources. It has a backend 
PDP and a database that stores the access rights of the user, identified by their identity 
attributes, to the resources, also identified by their identity attributes. API calls are available 
to add rights, remove rights and get rights from the database, and obtain an authorisation 
decision from the PDP. As described in Section 4, it is currently not possible to use only a 
standard policy decision point (PDP), since additional supporting functionality is needed 
which has not yet been standardized e.g. the ability to determine what access rights a user 
has. For this reason, the database is used to obtain the initial potential set of user access rights 
to resources, then the PDP is called to determine any additional policy based constraints, such 
as limits on the time of access, or whether break the glass must be first enacted etc. A full 
description of this API can be found in [20] and [21]. 
The Delegation API allows one user, the delegator, to delegate any attribute to another user, 
the delegate. It has a Delegation Issuing Web Service (DIS) [15] to support it. This web 
service has a backend LDAP directory that holds the users, both delegators and the delegates, 
and the attributes that the former have delegated to the latter, along with any delegation 
constraints, such as the period of delegation and whether the attributes can be re-delegated 
etc. The delegated attributes and delegation constraints are held in digitally signed X.509 
attribute certificates in the delegate’s LDAP entry, so that they cannot be tampered with. The 
attribute certificates are signed by the delegation service itself. There were several obstacles 
to overcome in using our pre-existing DIS in the current project, and these are discussed in 
the next section. 
API validation 
In order to validate the security APIs, we built a proxyS3 service which front ends a normal 
S3 service through its APIs (which are provided by both Amazon’s and Eucalyptus’s S3 
services). The proxyS3 service has been designed and built in a modular fashion, with 
configuration options specifying the resources and actions so that it can be adapted to other 
cloud storage services. The proxyS3 service comprises four parts: the security APIs (which 
can be used by any cloud service), the normal S3 APIs, a GUI (to capture input from the user 
and display results to the user) and the application logic which accesses both sets of APIs to 
upload, download files, and grant and enforce fine grained access to users etc. The 
application logic calls the security APIs and enforces the decisions they make, before calling 
the S3 APIs and displaying the results to the user via the GUI. In terms of policy based 
authorisation, the application logic is a policy enforcement point (PEP) which calls the 
security APIs in order to interact with the security services (authentication, authorisation and 
delegation) before enforcing their decisions when calling the S3 APIs. Figure 3 (top) shows 
the Welcome screen which the user is presented with when first contacting the cloud service. 
Figure 3 Welcome screen and account chooser screen. 
The proxyS3 uses the AWS library, which is written in php, to communicate with the cloud 
S3 service. It was therefore natural to write the entire proxyS3 service and security APIs in 
php. Whilst Eucalyptus provide a command line client, Amazon already uses a web browser 
to manage its S3 resources, but this is very limited in the authorisation and delegation 
services that it provides. Our proxyS3 provides a much richer set of capabilities via our 
defined security APIs, and in this way the user is able to provide finer grained control to the 
S3 resources by using a standard web browser. 
The proxyS3 service has an account database (DB) of S3 keys (user authentication 
credentials) for all the registered accounts so that the proxy S3 application can make requests 
to S3 on the account holder’s behalf. There is a many to many mapping between users and 
accounts. Users are identified by a set of identity attributes, similarly account holders. Thus 
one user may have a set of attributes which entitles him to own several different accounts 
(e.g. a professor from the University of Kent with PID abc, could be the owner of three S3 
accounts: one for professors from the University of Kent, one for PID abc, and one for all 
professors). Likewise many different users may possess the attributes required to be the 
owner of any particular S3 account (e.g. all professors at the University of Kent can be the 
owners of a single S3 account). See the bottom screen shot of Figure 3 for the Account 
Chooser window which allows the user to choose which account he wishes to create or open. 
When a federated user wishes to create an account on the S3 system for the first time, the 
proxy S3 service can make an ‘add user’ request to the S3 service, acting in the admin role, in 
order to add a new user to the cloud S3 system. It can then download the S3 user’s credentials 
from the cloud and store them in the DB. Whenever a federated user now wishes to access 
this S3 account, the proxyS3 service can extract the credentials from the DB and access the 
account on behalf of the user. This design hides the use of keys from the users and all the use 
of keys is performed inside the proxyS3 service. In order to maximise security, the DB 
should be stored separately from the proxyS3 module so that it can be separately protected, 
e.g. by encrypting the keys if necessary. 
Whilst our intention was for the proxyS3 service to automatically register new users (i.e. 
accounts) with the S3 service, unfortunately the Eucalyptus API did not allow the entire 
process to be fully automated. Human administrator involvement is required in the 
registration process, so we had to mark new accounts as “pending” when the user asked for 
them to be created. They had to stay in the pending state until our administrator activated 
Eucalyptus’s new user registration process. Once the account has been activated, it can then 
be opened by the user as described above. 
All the security functionality of the proxyS3 service is carried out by the three security APIs. 
Users do not need new cloud provided credentials (keys) to access the proxyS3 service. 
Instead, they use their existing authentication credentials to login via a federated identity 
provider which is trusted by the proxyS3 service. This trusted IdP then sends the user’s 
attributes to the proxyS3 service which allows it to determine the accounts this user is the 
owner of. In our demonstration proxyS3 service, we have configured the proxyS3 to trust our 
proxyIdP, rather than an actual IdP, since this provides greater flexibility and protocol 
support as described earlier. The proxyIdP is configured to trust a whole set of identity 
providers from the UK Access Management Federation, Google, Facebook, Twitter and 
OpenID. This was simply to ensure that a maximal set of users could try out our pilot service 
and experiment with it, since most people have a login account with at least one of these 
identity providers. We would not expect valuable cloud services to have such a lax trust 
policy in an operational environment! 
Implementing the delegation API raised several challenges. The main problem we 
encountered is that neither the delegators nor the delegates are initially known to the 
delegation issuing service (DIS), so the LDAP directory is initially empty. We solved this 
problem by dynamically populating the LDAP directory at the time of delegation, with the 
Persistent Identifiers (PIDs) and IdPs of both users. The combination of IdP name and PID is 
globally unique throughout a federation, so no two users will ever have the same LDAP 
distinguished name built from these two components. Since the delegator is already logged in 
at the time of delegation, the proxyS3 service has access to his PID and IdP. Unfortunately, 
neither the proxyS3 service nor the delegator will know the PID of the delegate. They also 
may not know which IdP the delegate is registered with. So how is the delegator to refer to 
his chosen delegate? We solved this problem through a process known as “delegation by 
invitation”. This splits the delegation process into two sub processes. In the first phase, 
delegation request, the delegator requests to delegate an attribute to a delegate. The top 
window of Figure 4 shows the screen for this, in which the delegator wishes to delegate the 
Family attribute to his Dad. Since the delegator is already known to the cloud service, his 
IdP/PID can be stored in the DIS’s LDAP directory. The DIS now issues an invitation token 
for the delegator to give to the delegate. It stores a copy of this along with the delegated 
attributes and any delegation constraints. The invitation token is actually a randomly 
generated 128 bit secret number, so it is reasonably strong to brute force or guessing attacks. 
The cloud service converts this into a “secret” URL which is passed back to the delegator. 
This is shown in the bottom screen shot of Figure 4. The delegator now gives this URL to his 
chosen delegate, by any out of band means e.g. via SMS, email or memory stick. Once the 
delegate clicks on the URL, phase 2, delegation acceptance, begins. The cloud service now 
presents the delegate with the federated authentication screen e.g. Figure 2, which requires 
the user to choose her IdP and authenticate. Once authenticated, the delegate is identified by 
his PID and IdP, and can be added to the DIS’s LDAP service. A new delegation attribute 
certificate can be created for her by the DIS, and stored in her LDAP entry. Whenever a user 
authenticates to the cloud service, it should ask the DIS for any attributes which have been 
delegated to this user, and add them to the identity attributes provided by the IdP. In this way 
the user can be given access to both the accounts that he or she owns, and the resources that 
have been delegated to him or her. So from now on the delegate may authenticate to the cloud 
service and access the delegated resources as often as he or she wishes, until either the 
delegation expires, or the delegator revokes the delegation, in which case the attribute 
certificate is removed from his/her LDAP entry. 
Figure 4 The delegation screens. 
Another issue we had to solve, is which attribute should be delegated to the delegate by the 
delegator. It would not be appropriate to allow the delegator to delegate one of his IdP 
provided attributes to anyone, since he has no authority to do this e.g. the first author of this 
paper should not be allowed by the cloud service to delegate his University of Kent professor 
attribute to anyone. The solution we conceived of, was to make the delegator an attribute 
authority for his own attributes, and to allow him to specify his own attribute values such as: 
friend, family, project X member etc. The attribute type is automatically created by the 
delegation issuing service based on the identity of the delegator, thereby ensuring global 
uniqueness of the delegated attribute type and value. 
Achievements 
Overall the project was very successful and achieved most of its original objectives as well as 
several new ones. Its main achievements were the specification of a set of three security APIs 
for cloud services and a pilot cloud storage service that demonstrated how to use them. These 
security APIs have been specified in natural language as well as in PHP. They have been 
implemented in PHP as open source code and are publicly available from the project’s web 
site [21]. 
We have made the proxyS3 service into a permanent public demonstration, available at 
https://authz.tas3.kent.ac.uk/proxyS3 which anyone can log into and use if they already have 
an account at either: Google, Facebook, Twitter, the UK Access Management Federation, or 
any OpenID provider. This should cover the vast majority of Internet users. We distribute the 
open source code, documentation, published papers and several powerpoint presentations via 
the public pages of the cloud service. In this way customers can experiment with the service, 
and if they like it, use the service to download its code and documentation. 
Of the original objectives that were not fully achieved, only two were not attempted: adding a 
trust and reputation service and auditing. This was simply to do with a lack of time in the 
original project. It would be possible, given a new project, to integrate these functionalities in 
an application independent way via some new APIs. 
With respect to the partially achieved objectives, most of these are to do with using policies 
for fine grained privacy control. Whilst the policy infrastructure itself was integrated into the 
cloud security APIs, there was insufficient time to implement the front end GUIs that would 
allow users to set their privacy policies and update them. Whilst we have built GUIs that 
allow users to set their access control rules, based on the attributes of the requestor, this does 
not provide an interface for setting more sophisticated features such as retention periods, 
purpose of use, or conditions such as time constraints. In the TAS3 project we experimented 
with several different policy GUIs – a natural language GUI, described in [22], and a simple 
matrix GUI of roles vs. resources in which the user clicks the various cells to indicate which 
users (roles) are granted access to which resources. The natural language GUI provides more 
functionality than the implemented attribute based GUI, but is more difficult to use. The 
matrix GUI provides less functionality than the attribute based GUI since the matrix’s roles 
and resources are statically configured, whilst the attribute based GUI dynamically changes 
the user’s choices as more attribute values become known to the proxyS3 service. 
Consequently neither of the GUIs developed within the TAS3 project were used further. 
Lessons learnt 
User interfaces are extremely important as this is how a software product is finally judged by 
end users. However, intuitive, easy to use GUIs are very time consuming and resource 
intensive to produce. Research projects often do not have the time or resources to spend on 
this feature, as often there is little “research” in providing this functionality. It is primarily an 
engineering task. When we decided to make the Eucalyptus S3 service accessible via a 
standard web browser, we effectively had to build the entire S3 front end again as dynamic 
web pages served from an Apache server. This consumed a large amount of development 
effort from the short six month project, and, in retrospect, was probably not the best use of 
our very limited resources. Consequently, in a subsequent project (Sticky Policy Based Open 
Source Security APIs for the Cloud), in which we have added federated access to OpenStack, 
we decided to enhance the existing OpenStack command line interfaces, rather than produce 
new browser based interfaces. This was certainly less time consuming, but it was not without 
its problems. Specifically, all of the existing IdPs expect users to be using web browsers for 
authentication, and therefore do not provide command line interfaces for this. Furthermore 
their web based login pages are all formatted differently and present different content to their 
users. So it would have been impractical to try to parse these and extract the username and 
password fields from them. We solved this problem by invoking the web browser from the 
command line interface, which allows the user to login using the existing IdP browser based 
interface with which he is familiar, and then asking the user to continue with the command 
line interface, now that he has been authenticated. 
Providing an appropriate GUI for setting security and privacy policies is also a very difficult 
task. Even providing an application dependent GUI, where many of the parameters of the 
policies are already known, and some can be fixed, it is still very difficult, due to the number 
of possibilities and combinations that still remain. Providing an application independent 
security policy GUI where none of the parameters are known or fixed beforehand, is orders of 
magnitude more difficult. We have had a previous EPSRC research project which researched 
this topic and which formed the basis of our current natural language GUI. This is capable of 
creating simple RBAC policies for any application. But this still is not sophisticated enough 
to cater for all the different policy constructs that may be needed (such as time constraints 
and arbitrary conditions), nor for all the different ways that users naturally use to specify the 
same thing. At the same time it is still more difficult to use the application independent 
constrained natural language GUI than a specially tailored and constrained application 
dependent GUI. We conclude that constructing application dependent policy GUIs are at the 
limit of our current computer science abilities, and that much more research is needed into 
building application independent policy management GUIs. 
Further work is still required in a number of other areas. Ontologies of attribute types and 
identity provider classes are needed in order to simplify the security APIs and make them 
scalable to Internet scale. The API programmer will then be able to ask for classes of 
attributes from classes of identity provider rather than having to specifically list them all e.g. 
request a credit card attribute from a bank, rather than a Visa card attribute from HSBC or a 
MasterCard attribute from Barclays Bank. 
Providing an implementation of the security APIs in PHP has provided a good initial proof of 
concept, but one language alone is not sufficient for all cloud developers to use since cloud 
applications may be developed in other programming languages such as Python, Java or C. 
Developing security APIs in other languages requires development effort rather than research 
effort. 
The current PHP implementation works well and has been stress tested, but it may not be as 
scalable as some cloud applications require, and certainly some of the existing back end 
services that it uses, such as LDAP, the PERMIS delegation service, the PDP, and MySQL 
database may not be as elastic as many cloud applications require. To make the security APIs 
and their supporting services horizontally and massively scalable is a huge research and 
development task in itself and should not be underestimated. 
Limitations and conclusions 
The proxyS3 service is a proof of concept cloud application that shows how the application 
independent security APIs can be used by any cloud application to provide federated access, 
enhanced fine grained access controls, and delegation of authority. The security APIs use 
attribute based access controls, so that access to a cloud resource is based on a user’s 
validated attributes from one or more trusted identity providers, instead of on a locally issued 
account ID. In this way users do not need to register for a new account with the cloud service 
before they can be granted access to it. Public access can be given to a cloud resource by 
simply not requiring the user to have any valid attributes. Delegation of authority is supported 
by the account holder becoming an attribute authority, and creating his own unique attributes. 
The current project did not attempt to integrate several trust based services due to a lack of 
time. In particular, no audit services were introduced, and no reputation service was 
incorporated. Thus cloud users are not able to validate that the trusted services are behaving 
as expected, nor are they able to determine which cloud providers are the most trustworthy. 
Whilst the authz API does support a call out to a PDP holding authorisation and privacy 
policies, we did not have time to implement the passing of sticky policies to the PDP via the 
cloud service and the browser interface. As explained above, this interface would have to be 
application specific, with many parameters being fixed by the application, so that users have 
an easy, but limited, set of policy choices to make. 
In conclusion, the 6 month My Private Cloud project gave us good insights into how to 
provide a rich set of security services to cloud developers, through the production of a set of 
security APIs. Providing open source security APIs to cloud developers should both increase 
the security of the developed cloud applications whilst simultaneously reducing the 
development effort that is needed to do this. We believe that this work should continue and 
that further security features should be added via new security APIs, as well as additional 
implementations of the existing APIs be developed in further languages such as Python. 
Endnotes 
1More sophisticated PDPs may be able to return Not Applicable, Indeterminate and Break 
The Glass responses as well. 
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